

Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 10CARACAS201, Venezuela: The GBRV's Political Response to Colombian Offer

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#10CARACAS201**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
10CARACAS201	2010-02-18 22:50	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Caracas

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.elespectador.com/wikileaks>

VZCZCXRO7224
RR RUEHAO RUEHRS
DE RUEHCV #0201 0492250
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 182250Z FEB 10 ZFF3
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0479
INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUCPDO/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000201

SIPDIS
ENERGY FOR ALOCKWOOD AND LEINSTEIN, DOE/EIA FOR MCLINE
HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
TREASURY FOR MKACZMAREK
COMMERCE FOR 4332/MAC/WH/JLAO
NSC FOR DRESTREPO AND LROSSELLO
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18

TAGS: [ENRG](#) [ECON](#) [EINV](#) [CO](#) [VE](#)

SUBJECT: Venezuela: The GBRV's Political Response to Colombian Offer of Assistance

REF: 10 CARACAS 35; 10 CARACAS 139; 10 CARACAS 173

CLASSIFIED BY: DarnallSteuart, Economic Counselor, DOS, Econ;
REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

¶1. (SBU) In response to press reports of Colombian Minister of Mines and Energy HernC!nMartC-nez' offer to help Venezuela through its current electricity crisis, Venezuela's Executive Vice President ElC-as Jaua rejected the Colombian offer on Tuesday, February 16. On Wednesday, February 17, Venezuelan Minister for Electricity AlC- RodrC-guez clarified the GBRV's position, stating that it would analyze any Colombian offer, just as it had done with Brazil's offer of assistance.

¶2. (SBU) Venezuelan press reports on February 18 quote RodrC-guez as modifying the GBRV's position even further, expressing skepticism about Colombia's intentions and noting, "The most that Colombia has supplied Venezuela is 140 MW and the consumption here is 17,000 MW. If the Colombian offer is serious, it could contribute to resolving part of the problem, but only a small part." Press reports, however, state 140 MW represents 70% of the GBRV's goal in its electricity reduction program for Caracas (200 MW) and that 140 MW could supply the electricity needs of an entire city, such as Puerto La Cruz.

¶3. (SBU) According to statements published in the Venezuelan press on February 11, Colombian Foreign Minister Jaime BermC:dez said that the GOC had not ceased dialogue with Venezuela despite bilateral tensions. This was followed up on February 12 with Colombian Defense Minister Gabriel Silva's statement saying the GOC was expecting "a signal of the GBRV's willingness to settle differences and fight regional enemies..." He added that if the bilateral relations between the two states "limped back together," Colombia could help Venezuela on security issues. According to press reports, the GBRV expected to receive a formal Colombian offer on Thursday, February 18.

¶4. (C) COMMENT: After months of the GBRV demonizing Colombia and politicizing the bilateral relationship, Colombia's offer caught the GBRV unprepared. Newly named Vice President Jaua was quick to reject a potential offer of assistance, RodrC-guez walked back Jaua's comments, and then added his own political spin to Colombia's offer. For its part, the GBRV has (1) created a ministry to confront the issue, (2) appointed, fired, and appointed a new electricity minister, (3) enacted unpopular electricity rationing measures across the country, (4) accepted assistance from Brazil, Argentina, and Cuba, (5) declared an electricity state of emergency and (6) appointed an "Electricity General Staff" to handle the crisis. The GBRV would be hard pressed to explain how a Colombian offer is "political" when most of its own responses to the crisis could also be construed as "political" and "bureaucratic." Given the Venezuelan public's frustration with the GBRV's own efforts to date, it appears that Minister RodrC-guez understood better than the new Vice President that for both political and practical reasons a more open response to Colombia constituted the wiser course. END COMMENT.
DUDDY